Comment on Theories on Theories
supersquirrel@sopuli.xyz 20 hours ago
Economics: Our findings our just as rigorous as these other sciences we swear!
I once called economics a pseudoscience in a reddit comment and some libertarian-capitalist type got suuuper butthurt about it.
He said I don’t understand the word pseudoscience. I said, “no I understand it just fine. You don’t understand economics.”
His only response was to call that a “no, you” argument. Dunning-Kruger on full display.
Basic foundational “observations” by Economics aren’t based on the Scientific Method.
I wish the Scientific Method didn’t have “Method” in the name because while it is a sensible name it also is misleading.
Science is method agnostic, that is a necessary and sometimes brutal aspect to scientific progress, a new promising method may uncover other methods and theories that totally pull the rug out from under old theories.
Economics, because it began and is sustained for the most part as a system of methods searching for justification for their continuation, is largely incapable of undergoing these necessary “method resets” that come periodically in any scientific discipline.
Thus no matter if locally good science is being done in economics it is undermined by the uncomfortable need to preserve the survival of the foundatinal contextualizing methods and axioms they invoke implicitly from the truth uncovered, a vice that plagues any human endeavor consciously and subconsciously and not only keeps Economics from being a real science it also largely sucks the oxygen out of the room for actually scientifically rigorous study of these phenomena.
Any time I’ve attempted to argue for alternative economic paradigms (not just alternative economic systems, but actually rethinking the fundamental assumptions and theories by which we study and attempt to understand economic systems and phenomena), lazy thinkers hit me with the “nuh uh, that’s not what [classical economic theory] says! You don’t know what you’re talking about.”
It’s a thoughtless appeal to authority lacking any substance. The word for that is “dogma.”
I think a major casualty of the war on science funded primarily by fossil fuel interests has been that the kneejerk pro-science response has become a lazy appeal to authority.
People say “99% of scientists all agree listen to them you are not worthy of having an opinion on this!” and while it is true, it also sends an undermining message to the interests of science.
Science is the practice of skepticism not of finding facts. Facts are the inevitable residue of science after science has subjected a theory to extended and diverse torturous inquisition.
I wish people defended science by saying it isn’t a set of Correct Facts but a system of Skepticism that has thoroughly examined a shared body of knowledge and that you should assume that if the more fantastic sounding theories contained within that arena of Skeptical Melee haven’t been dismantled that you can probably trust that they are real as fantastic as they sound.
This when you shortens it sounds like an appeal to authority where the scientists are given undue authority but it is not the same thing. What matters is the environment of genuine skepticism that scientific theories and “facts” are subjected to in order to establish their validity that matters not the theories and facts themselves.
I like the term Scientific filter. Theories get endlessly filtered though experimentation untill we get purer and purer truth.
What definition of pseudoscience would capture economics without capturing medicine, ecology, or meteorology?
Everyone’s just using models here, and the way we incorporate statistical observations to define the limits of the models’ scope, and refine the models over time, or reject the models entirely, applies to economists, meteorologists, seismologists, and many branches of actual human medicine.
Popper would define pseudoscience as predictions that can’t be falsified, but surely that can’t apply to the idea of the weatherman predicting rain and being wrong, right?
Kuhn came along and argued that science is about solving problems within paradigms, and sometimes rejecting paradigms in scientific revolutions (geocentrism vs heliocentrism, Newtonian physics versus Einstein’s relativity), but it wasn’t a particularly robust test for separating out pseudoscience.
Lakatos categorized things further at explaining how model-breaking observations could be handled within the structure of how science performs its work (limiting the scope of the model, expanding the complexity of the model to fit the new observations, proposing specific exception handlers), but also observed the difference between the hard core of a discipline, in which attempts at refutation were not tolerated, and auxiliary hypotheses where the scientists were free to test their ideas for falsifiability.
But when you use these ideas to try to understand how science works, I don’t think economics really stands out as less scientific than cancer research or climatology or other statistically driven scientific disciplines.
To quote the order commenter here, basic foundational “observations” by Economics aren’t based on the Scientific Method.
In what way? And how does that differ from how medicine measures pain?
A weatherman predicting rain has made a falsifiable prediction, how does that relate to Popper?
how does that relate to Popper?
When a weatherman’s prediction is falsified, the model itself is not disproven. The fact that the practitioners of that discipline stick with it even when a prediction is falsified starts to look like the pseudoscience side of Popper’s falsifiability criterion.
hahah same for psychology
Do they claim that though? Neo-liberal economists often adopt praxeology openly, and the other ones are mostly deluding themselves.
sbv@sh.itjust.works 20 hours ago
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