pcalau12i
@pcalau12i@lemmygrad.ml
- Comment on Rock Auras - Not just for Hippies anymore 5 days ago:
I will be the controversial one and say that I reject that “consciousness” even exists in the philosophical sense. Of course, things like intelligence, self-awareness, problem-solving capabilities, even emotions exist, but it’s possible to describe all of these things in purely functional terms, which would in turn be computable. When people like about “consciousness not being computable” they are talking about the Chalmerite definition of “consciousness” popular in philosophical circles specifically.
This is really just a rehashing of Kant’s noumena-phenomena distinction, but with different language. The rehashing goes back to the famous “What is it like to be a bat?” paper by Thomas Nagel. Nagel argues that physical reality must be independent of point of view (non-contextual, non-relative, absolute), whereas what we perceive clearly depends upon point of view (contextual). You and I are not seeing the same thing for example, even if we look at the same object we will see different things from our different standpoints.
Nagel thus concludes that what we perceive cannot be reality as it really is, but must be some sort of fabrication by the mammalian brain. It is not equivalent to reality as it is really is (which is said to be non-contextual) but must be something irreducible to the subject. What we perceive, therefore, he calls “subjective,” and since observation, perception and experience are all synonyms, he calls this “subjective experience.”
Chalmers later in his paper “Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness” renames this “subjective experience” to “consciousness.” He points out that if everything we perceive is “subjective” and created by the brain, then true reality must be independent of perception, i.e. no perception could ever reveal it, we can never observe it and it always lies beyond all possible observation. How does this entirely invisible reality which is completely disconnected from everything we experience, in certain arbitrary configurations, “give rise to” what we experience. This “explanatory gap” he calls the “hard problem of consciousness.”
This is just a direct rehashing in different words Kant’s phenomena-noumena distinction, where the “phenomena” is the “appearance of” reality as it exists from different points of view, and the “noumena” is that which exists beyond all possible appearances, the “thing-in-itself” which, as the term implies, suggests it has absolute (non-contextual) properties as it can be meaningfully considered in complete isolation. Velocity, for example, is contextual, so objects don’t meaningfully have velocity in complete isolation; to say objects meaningfully exist in complete isolation is to thus make a claim that they have a non-contextual ontology. This leads to the same kind of “explanatory gap” between the two which was previously called the “mind-body problem.”
The reason I reject Kantianism and its rehashing by the Chalmerites is because Nagel’s premise is entirely wrong. Physical reality is not non-contextual. There is no “thing-in-itself.” Physical reality is deeply contextual. The imagined non-contextual “godlike” perspective whereby everything can be conceived of as things-in-themselves in complete isolation is a fairy tale. In physical reality, the ontology of a thing can only be assigned to discrete events whereby its properties are always associated with a particular context, and, as shown in the famous Wigner’s friend thought experiment, the ontology of a system can change depending upon one’s point of view.
This non-contextual physical reality from Nagel is just a fairy tale, and so his argument in the rest of his paper does not follow that what we observe (synonym for: experience, perceive) is “subjective,” and if Nagel fails to establish “subjective experience,” then Chalmers fails to establish “consciousness” which is just a renaming of this term, and thus Chalmers fails to demonstrate an “explanatory gap” between consciousness and reality because he has failed to establish that “consciousness” is a thing at all.
What’s worse is that if you buy Chalmers’ and Nagel’s bad arguments then you basically end up equating observation as a whole with “consciousness,” and thus you run into the Penrose conclusion that it’s “non-computable.” Of course we cannot compute what we observe, because what we observe is not consciousness, it is just reality. And reality itself is not computable. The way in which reality evolves through time is computable, but reality as a whole just is. It’s not even a meaningful statement to speak of “computing” it, as if existence itself is subject to computation.
- Comment on You cannot learn without failing. 6 days ago:
That’s more religion than pseudoscience. Pseudoscience tries to pretend to be science and tricks a lot of people into thinking it is legitimate science, whereas religion just makes proclamations and claims it must be wrong if any evidence debunks them. Pseudoscience is a lot more sneaky, and has become more prevalent in academia itself ever since people were infected by the disease of Popperism.
Popperites believe something is “science” as long as it can in principle be falsified, so you invent a theory that could in principle be tested then you have proposed a scientific theory. So pseudoscientists come up with the most ridiculous nonsense ever based on literally nothing and then insist everyone must take it seriously because it could in theory be tested one day, but it is always just out of reach of actually being tested.
Since it is testable and the brain disease of Popperism that has permeated academia leads people to be tricked by this sophistry, sometimes these pseudoscientists can even secure funding to test it, especially if they can get a big name in physics to endorse it. If it’s being tested at some institution somewhere, if there is at least a couple papers published of someone looking into it, it must be genuine science, right?
Meanwhile, while they create this air of legitimacy, a smokescreen around their ideas, they then reach out to a laymen audience through publishing books, doing documentaries on television, or publishing videos to YouTube, talking about woo nuttery like how we’re all trapped inside a giant “cosmic consciousness” and we are all feel each other’s vibrations through quantum entanglement, and that somehow science proves the existence of gods.
As they make immense dough off of the laymen audience they grift off of, if anyone points to the fact that their claims are based on nothing, they just can deflect to the smokescreen they created through academia.
- Comment on shrimp colour drama 1 week ago:
Color is not invented by the brain but is socially constructed. You cannot look inside someone’s brain and find a blob of green, unless idk you let the brain mold for awhile. All you can do is ask the person to think of “green” and then correlate whatever their brain patterns are that respond to that request, but everyone’s brain patterns are different so the only thing that ties them all together is that we’ve all agreed as a society to associate a certain property in reality with “green.”
If you were an alien who had no concept of green and had abducted a single person, if that person is thinking of “green,” you would have no way to know because you have no concept of “green,” you would just see arbitrary patterns in their brain that to you would seem meaningless. Without the ability to reference that back to the social system, you cannot identify anything “green” going on in their brain, or for any colors at all, or, in fact, for any concepts in general.
This was the point of Wittgenstein’s rule-following problem, that ultimately it is impossible to tie any symbol (such as “green”) back to a concrete meaning without referencing a social system. If you were on a deserted island and forgot what “green” meant and started to use it differently, there would be no one to correct you, so that new usage might as well be what “green” meant.
If you try to not change your usage by building up a basket of green items to remind you of what “green” is, there is no basket you could possibly construct that would have no ambiguity. If you put a green apple and a green lettuce in there, and you forget what “green” is so you look at the basket for reference, you might think, for example, that “green” just refers to healthy vegetation. No matter how many items you add to the basket, there will always be some ambiguity, some possible definition that is compatible with all your examples yet not your original intention.
Without a social system to reference for meaning and to correct your mistakes, there is no way to be sure that today you are even using symbols the same way you used them yesterday. Indeed, there would be no reason for someone born and grew up in complete isolation to even develop any symbols at all, because they would just all be fuzzy and meaningless. They would still have a brain and intelligence and be able to interpret the world, but they would not divide it up into rigid categories like “green” or “red” or “dogs” or “cats.” They would think in a way where everything kind of merges together, a mode of thought that is very alien to social creatures and so we cannot actually imagine what it is like.
- Comment on trapped in the middle with u 2 weeks ago:
So a couple of intergalactic hydrogen atoms could exchange a photon across light years and become entangled for the rest of time, casually sharing some quantum of secrets as they coast to infinity.
Nope. No “secrets” are being exchanged between these particles.
- Comment on trapped in the middle with u 2 weeks ago:
The point wasn’t that the discussion is stupid, but that believing particles can be in two states at once is stupid. Schrodinger was doing a kind of argument known as a reduction to absurdity in his paper The Present Situation in Quantum Mechanics. He was saying that if you believe a single particle can be in two states at once, it could trivially cause a chain reaction that would put a macroscopic object in two states at once, and that it’s absurd to think a cat can be in two states at once, ergo a particle cannot be in two states at once.
In his later work Science and Humanism, Schrodinger argues that all the confusion around quantum mechanics originates from assuming that if that particles are autonomous objects with their own individual existence. If this were to be the case, then the particle must have properties localizable to itself, such as its position. And if the particle’s position is localized to itself and merely a function of itself, then it would have a position at all times. That means if the particle is detected by a detector at t=0 and a detector at t=1 and no detection is made at t=0.5, the particle should have some position value at t=0.5.
If the particle has properties like position at all times, then the changes in its position must always be continuous as there would be no gaps between t=0 and t=1 where it lacks a position but would have a position at t=0.1, t=0.2, etc. Schrodinger referred to this as the “history” of the particle, saying that whenever a particle shows up on a detector, we always assume it must have come from somewhere, that it used to be somewhere else before arriving at the detector.
However, Schrodinger viewed this as mistake that isn’t actually backed by the empirical evidence. We can only make observations at discrete moments in time, and to assume the particle is doing something in between those observation is by definition to make assumptions about something we cannot, by definition, observe, and so it can never actually be empirically verified.
Indeed, Schrodinger’s concern was more that it could not be verified, but that all the confusion around quantum theory comes precisely from what he called trying to “fill in the gaps” of the particle’s history. When you do so, you run into logical contradictions without introducing absurdities, like nonlocal action, retrocausality, or these days it’s even popular to talk about multiverses. Schrodinger also pointed out how the measurement problem, too, directly stems from trying to fill in the gaps of the particle’s history.
Schrodinger thought it made more sense to just abandon the notion that particles are really autonomous objects with their own individual existence. They only exist at the moment they are interacting with something, and the physical world evolves through a sequence of discrete events and not through continuous transitions of autonomous entities.
He actually used to hate this idea and criticized Heisenberg for it as it was basically Heisenberg’s view as well, saying “I cannot believe that the electron hops about like a flea.” However, in the same book he mentions that he changed his mind precisely because of the measurement problem. He says that he introduced the Schrodinger equation as a way to “fill in the gaps” between these “hops,” but that it actually fails to achieve this because it just shifts the gap between from between “hops” to between measurements as the system would evolve continuously up until measurement then have a sudden transition to a discrete value.
Schrodinger didn’t think it made sense that measurement should be special or play any sort of role in the theory over any other kind of physical interaction. By not trying to fill in the gaps at all, then no physical interaction is treated as special and all are put on an equal playing field, and so you don’t have a problem of measurement.
- Comment on Don't look now 1 month ago:
We know how it works, we just don’t yet understand what is going on under the hood.
Why should we assume “there is something going on under the hood”? This is my problem with most “interpretations” of quantum mechanics. They are complex stories to try and “explain” quantum mechanics, like a whole branching multiverse, of which we have no evidence for.
It’s kind of like if someone wanted to come up with deep explanation to “explain” Einstein’s field equations and what is “going on under the hood”. Why should anything be “underneath” those equations? If we begin to speculate, we’re doing just tha,t speculation, and if we take any of that speculation seriously as in actually genuinely believe it, then we’ve left the realm of being a scientifically-minded rational thinker.
It is much simpler to just accept the equations at face-value, to accept quantum mechanics at face-value. “Measurement” is not in the theory anywhere, there is no rigorous formulation of what qualifies as a measurement. The state vector is reduced whenever a physical interaction occurs from the reference point of the systems participating in the interaction, but not for the systems not participating in it, in which the systems are then described as entangled with one another.
This is not an “interpretation” but me just explaining literally how the terminology and mathematics works. If we just accept this at face value there is no “measurement problem.” The only reason there is a “measurement problem” is because this contradicts with people’s basic intuitions: if we accept quantum mechanics at face value then we have to admit that whether or not properties of systems have well-defined values actually depends upon your reference point and is contingent on a physical interaction taking place.
Our basic intuition tells us that particles are autonomous entities floating around in space on their lonesome like little stones or billiard balls up until they collide with something, and so even if they are not interacting with anything at all they meaningfully can be said to “exist” with well-defined properties which should be the same properties for all reference points (i.e. the properties are absolute rather than relational). Quantum mechanics contradicts with this basic intuition so people think there must be something “wrong” with it, there must be something “under the hood” we don’t yet understand and only if we make the story more complicated or make a new discovery one day we’d “solve” the “problem.”
Einstein once said, God does not place dice, and Bohr rebutted with, stop telling God what to do. This is my response to people who believe in the “measurement problem.” Stop with your preconceptions on how reality should work. Quantum theory is our best theory of nature and there is currently no evidence it is going away any time soon, and it’s withstood the test of time for decades. We should stop waiting for the day it gets overturned and disappears and just accept this is genuinely how reality works, accept it at face-value and drop our preconceptions. We do not need any additional “stories” to explain it.
- Comment on Gottem. :) 1 month ago:
So usually this is explained with two scientists, Alice and Bob, on far away planets. They’re each in the possession of a particle that is entangled with the other, and in a superposition of state 1 and state 2.
This “usual” way of explaining it is just overly complicating it and making it seem more mystical than it actually is. We should not say the particles are “in a superposition” as if this describes the current state of the particle. The superposition notation should be interpreted as merely a list of probability amplitudes predicting the different likelihoods of observing different states of the system in the future.
It is sort of like if you flip a coin, while it’s in the air, you can say there is a 50% chance it will land heads and a 50% chance it will land tails. This is not a description of the coin in the present as if the coin is in some smeared out state of 50% landed heads and 50% landed tails. It has not landed at all yet!
Unlike classical physics, quantum physics is fundamentally random, so you can only predict events probabilistically, but one should not conflate the prediction of a future event to the description of the present state of the system. The superposition notation is only writing down probability amplitudes of the likelihoods of what you will observe (state 1 or state 2) of the particles in the future event that you go to the interact with it and is not a description of the state of the particles in the present.
When Alice measures the state of her particle, it collapses into one of the states, say state 1. When Bob measures the state of his particle immediately after, before any particle travelling at light speed could get there, it will also be in state 1 (assuming they were entangled in such a way that the state will be the same).
This mistreatment of the mathematical notation as a description of the present state of the system also leads to confusing language like “it collapses into one of the states” as if the change in a probability distribution represents a physical change to the system. The mental picture people say this often have is that the particle literally physically becomes the probability distribution prior to measuring it—the particle “spreads out” like a wave according to the probability amplitudes of the state vector—and when you measure the particle, this allows you to update the probabilities, and so they must interpret this as the wave physically contracting into an eigenvalue—it “collapses” like a house of cards.
But this is, again, overcomplicating things. The particle never spreads out like a wave and it never “collapses” back into a particle. The mathematical notation is just a way of capturing the likelihoods of the particle showing up in one state or the other, and when you measure what state it actually shows up in, then you can update your probabilities accordingly. For example, if you the coin is 50%/50% heads/tails and you observe it land on tails, you can update the probabilities to 0%/100% heads/tails because you know it landed on tails and not heads. Nothing “collapsed”: you’re just observing the actual outcome of the event you were predicting and updating your statistics accordingly.
- Comment on Observer 1 month ago:
I don’t think solving the Schrodinger equation really gives you a good idea of why quantum mechanics is even interesting. You also shouldstudy very specific applications of it where it yields counterintuitive outcomes to see why it is interesting, such as in the GHZ experiment.
- Comment on You'll never see it coming 3 months ago:
By applying both that and the many worlds hypothesis, the idea of quantum immortality comes up, and thats a real mind bender. Its also a way to verifiably prove many worlds accurate(afaik the only way)
MWI only somewhat makes sense (it still doesn’t make much sense) if you assume the “branches” cannot communicate with each other after decoherence occurs. “Quantum immortality” mysticism assumes somehow your cognitive functions can hop between decoherent branches where you are still alive if they cease in a particular branch. It is self-contradictory. There is nothing in the mathematical model that would predict this and there is no mechanism to explain how it could occur.
It also has a problem similar to reincarnation mysticism. If MWI is correct (it’s not), then there would be an infinite number of other decoherent branches containing other “yous.” Which “you” would your consciousness hop into when you die, assuming this even does occur (it doesn’t)? It makes zero sense.
- Comment on I'm literally a thinking lump of fat 3 months ago:
Depends upon what you mean by “consciousness.” A lot of the literature seems to use “consciousness” just to refer to physical reality as it exists from a particular perspective, for some reason. For example, one popular definition is “what it is like to be in a particular perspective.” The term “to be” refers to, well, being, which refers to, well, reality. So we are just talking about reality as it actually exists from a particular perspective, as opposed to mere description of reality from that perspective.
I find it bizarre to call this “consciousness,” but words are words. You can define them however you wish. If we define “consciousness” in this sense, as many philosophers do, then it does not make logical sense to speak of your “consciousness” doing anything at all after you die, as your “consciousness” would just be defined as reality as it actually exists from your perspective. Perspectives always implicitly entail a physical object that is at the basis of that perspective, akin to the zero-point of a coordinate system, which in this case that object is you.
If you cease to exist, then your perspective ceases to even be defined. The concept of “your perspective” would no longer even be meaningful. It would be kind of like if a navigator kept telling you to go “more north” until eventually you reach the north pole, and then they tell you to go “more north” yet again. You’d be confused, because “more north” does not even make sense anymore at the north pole. The term ceases to be meaningfully applicable. If consciousness is defined as being from a particular perspective (as many philosophers in the literature define it), then by logical necessity the term ceases to be meaningful after the object that is the basis of that perspective ceases to exist.
But, like I said, I’m not a fan of defining “consciousness” in this way, albeit it is popular to do so in the literature. My criticism of the “what it is like to be” definition is mainly that most people tend to associate “consciousness” with mammalian brains, yet the definition is so broad that there is no logical reason as to why it should not be applicable to even a single fundamental particle.
- Comment on I'm literally a thinking lump of fat 3 months ago:
This problem presupposes metaphysical realism, so you have to be a metaphysical realist to take the problem seriously. Metaphysical realism is a particular kind of indirect realism whereby you posit that everything we observe is in some sense not real, sometimes likened to a kind of “illusion” created by the mammalian brain, called “consciousness” or sometimes “subjective experience” with the adjective “subjective” used to make it clear it is being interpreted as something unique to conscious subjects and not ontologically real.
If everything we observe is in some sense not reality, then “true” reality must by definition be independent of what we observe. If this is the case, then it opens up a whole bunch of confusing philosophical problems, as it would logically mean the entire universe is invisible/unobservable/nonexperiential, except in the precise configuration of matter in the human brain which somehow “gives rise to” this property of visibility/observability/experience. It seems difficult to explain this without just presupposing this property arbitrarily attaches itself to brains in a particular configuration, i.e. to treat it as strongly emergent, which is effectively just dualism, indeed the founder of the “hard problem of consciousness” is a self-described dualist.
This philosophical problem does not exist in direct realist schools of philosophy, however, such as Jocelyn Benoist’s contextual realism, Carlo Rovelli’s weak realism, or in Alexander Bogdanov’s empiriomonism. It is solely a philosophical problem for metaphysical realists, because they begin by positing that there exists some fundamental gap between what we observe and “true” reality, then later have to figure out how to mend the gap. Direct realist philosophies never posit this gap in the first place and treat reality as precisely equivalent to what we observe it to be, so it simply does not posit the existence of “consciousness” and it would seem odd in a direct realist standpoint to even call experience “subjective.”