The conclusion doesnât follow from the premises. Being fixed in a tangible medium is a prerequisite for copyright protection, not a test for derivative works. To show that LLM weights are derivative, you would have to demonstrate that they recast, transform, or adapt the protected expression of specific copyrighted works. Whether neural-network weights satisfy that standard is precisely the legal issue currently before the courts, so it is not âby definitionâ settled. The distinction between human neurons and digital weights addresses fixation, but it does not establish that the weights themselves contain copyrightable expression.
More importantly, both humans and LLMs generate novel responses by drawing on what they have previously learned. A human uses patterns encoded in neural connections to formulate thoughts, while an LLM uses statistical patterns encoded in its weights to generate text. In both cases, the underlying information influences the output rather than being reproduced verbatim. The distinction between biological neurons and machine weights does not, by itself, answer the copyright question. The relevant legal issue is whether the resulting output or the weights themselves contain protectable expression from the original works, not whether the learning system is biological or computational.
Your final sentence also makes an unsupported leap: ââŚmaking it a derivative work of the training material by definition.â Nothing in the statutory definition of a derivative work says that any fixed artifact produced after analyzing copyrighted material is automatically derivative. That conclusion is asserted rather than demonstrated. A derivative work must recast, transform, or adapt the protected expression of an existing work. Simply being created through exposure to copyrighted material is not sufficient.
As an aside, I agree that trade dress can, in limited circumstances, protect a companyâs distinctive visual identity under trademark law. However, that is a separate area of law from copyright and does not materially affect the point I was making. My example concerned copyright royalties for learning and creating in a similar style, not trademark claims based on consumer confusion.
Moreover, I think Iâll end the discussion here. You and I are both unqualified to truly determine or judge whether this is copyright infringement. Weâll see what the courts ultimately decide.
On a personal level, I honestly couldnât care less how it turns out. AI and LLMs donât impact my life in any meaningful way, so I donât have a personal stake in the outcome.
My main concern is that many people donât really understand copyright law itself. Itâs not as simple as saying, âI made this, therefore itâs protected.â Thatâs simply not how copyright works.
mechoman444@lemmy.world â¨2⊠â¨weeks⊠ago
The conclusion doesnât follow from the premises. Being fixed in a tangible medium is a prerequisite for copyright protection, not a test for derivative works. To show that LLM weights are derivative, you would have to demonstrate that they recast, transform, or adapt the protected expression of specific copyrighted works. Whether neural-network weights satisfy that standard is precisely the legal issue currently before the courts, so it is not âby definitionâ settled. The distinction between human neurons and digital weights addresses fixation, but it does not establish that the weights themselves contain copyrightable expression.
More importantly, both humans and LLMs generate novel responses by drawing on what they have previously learned. A human uses patterns encoded in neural connections to formulate thoughts, while an LLM uses statistical patterns encoded in its weights to generate text. In both cases, the underlying information influences the output rather than being reproduced verbatim. The distinction between biological neurons and machine weights does not, by itself, answer the copyright question. The relevant legal issue is whether the resulting output or the weights themselves contain protectable expression from the original works, not whether the learning system is biological or computational.
Your final sentence also makes an unsupported leap: ââŚmaking it a derivative work of the training material by definition.â Nothing in the statutory definition of a derivative work says that any fixed artifact produced after analyzing copyrighted material is automatically derivative. That conclusion is asserted rather than demonstrated. A derivative work must recast, transform, or adapt the protected expression of an existing work. Simply being created through exposure to copyrighted material is not sufficient.
As an aside, I agree that trade dress can, in limited circumstances, protect a companyâs distinctive visual identity under trademark law. However, that is a separate area of law from copyright and does not materially affect the point I was making. My example concerned copyright royalties for learning and creating in a similar style, not trademark claims based on consumer confusion.
Moreover, I think Iâll end the discussion here. You and I are both unqualified to truly determine or judge whether this is copyright infringement. Weâll see what the courts ultimately decide.
On a personal level, I honestly couldnât care less how it turns out. AI and LLMs donât impact my life in any meaningful way, so I donât have a personal stake in the outcome.
My main concern is that many people donât really understand copyright law itself. Itâs not as simple as saying, âI made this, therefore itâs protected.â Thatâs simply not how copyright works.