Once you delve into the technical parts of it, it’s actually not that unusual. I wrote more detail in another comment on this post, but the TLDR of it is that Secure Boot is meant to enforce the integrity of the boot procedure to ensure that only approved code runs before the Windows kernel gets control, and the TPM 2.0 is meant to attest to that. Together, they make it possible for anticheat to tell if something tried to rootkit Windows to evade detection.
WhyJiffie@sh.itjust.works 5 hours ago
its like you are intentionally trying to misunderstand what they are saying, good work at it. Obviously, they didn’t deem SB and TPM unusual, but the types of software (entertainment industry products) demanding it while the software of the security industry does not.
consumers won’t benefit from this functionality, but many industries will in the foreseeable future
pivot_root@lemmy.world 1 hour ago
You quoted the end of my comment, so you must have read this part:
For the threat model of anticheat software, verifying system integrity is not an unusual requirement.