Comment on Telegram is indistinguishable from an FSB honeypot
rysiek@szmer.info 2 days agoAs long as they’re not using Russian-purchased sims to manage and post to the channels, how does this change their security model going forward?
If IStories’ reporting on GNM’s connection to FSB and GNM’s access to Telegram’s traffic is correct – and I have no reason to believe otherwise, this has gone through two rounds of fact-checking and these are people who had been sued for “defamation” in the most journalist-hostile, oligarch-friendly jurisdiction in the world (UK) and have repeatedly won – then this means the threat model now includes the FSB potentially being able to:
- figure out where a user is in the world just by observing their Telegram network traffic, live or close to live;
- with some additional analysis, based on timing and packet sizes correlation, probably figure out who that user is communicating via Telegram.
Both of these globally, regardless of what SIM card was used to register any of accounts involved, and without having to ask Telegram for any data.
I don’t know if FSB is actually using this capability, and to what extent, and against whom. But based on IStories’ reporting and on my own packet captures analysis it is entirely possible for them to do so if they choose to.
Five@beehaw.org 2 days ago
For those organizations like BOAK and Resistance Committee, Telegram functions as a home page for making public announcements. It is superior to having a website because it can’t be DDOS’d, has fewer attack surfaces that the organization has to be responsible to keep secure, doesn’t have ICANN WHOIS reporting, or need someone’s credit card on file. It’s also free and has the network effect of Telegram’s existing popularity.
Do you think that Telegram can continue to be used for this purpose while taking additional security precautions? Or do you think the risk is too great, and no amount of precautions can justify using the service?
rysiek@szmer.info 2 days ago
No. Their very existence on Telegram is drawing more people to Telegram, and helping keep on Telegram people who might already be thinking of leaving it. Publishing on Telegram helps the FSB spy on more people. In this case, people who are anti-Putin.
In other words, by continuing to use Telegram and thus by drawing more people onto that platform and keeping them there through network effects these organizations are drawing people opposed to Putin;'s regime directly into FSB’s dragnet.
I cannot see this as anything but massively irresponsible.
In my opinion the only somewhat justifiable way to use their Telegram presence today would be to try and get people who are on Telegram out of Telegram. But that’s a very tall order, and would have to be done thoughtfully, carefully, and with a plan.
Five@beehaw.org 2 days ago
What platforms do you approve of that could be viable alternatives?
rysiek@szmer.info 2 days ago
Signal would be a good replacement for private messages and groups. I’m in groups of hundreds of people there, I’m sure larger groups exist.
As to channels… seriously just set up a simple website with an RSS feed? That’s the simplest. A lot of providers have free DDoS protection now as well. If you’re worried about privacy and whatnot, choose a provider like 1984.is or FlokiNET.
The broader point is: we really need to get people out of centralized platforms and onto less gate-kept spaces. Because with centralized platforms it is always possible they enshittify or turn out to be bad in some important way, and when that happens, the network effects hold us and our audience ransom. Moving back to web is one way of doing that. Joining the Fediverse (hullo!) is another.
And yes, I am waiting for truly decentralized end-to-end encrypted internet messaging tools to become usable enough to replace Signal eventually. One thing I am looking at – and again, it is not ready yet! – is Cwtch. Another thing I am really hopeful for is the Veilid protocol. But these are still ways off from being ready for prime time and widespread non-techie use. One day though!