Comment on do you think freewill truly exists?
crt0o@lemm.ee 3 weeks agoThe reason is trying to work towards a model which could actually solve the hard problem, something which the physicalism prevalent in science has failed at completely. Consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality, and it needs to be taken seriously, any model which doesn’t include it is either inacurrate or incomplete. Yes, a single particle might act randomly, but that might not hold for a more complex entangled system, especially an orchestrated one inside a living being.
pcalau12i@lemmy.world 3 weeks ago
There is no “hard problem.” It’s made up. Nagel’s paper that Chalmers bases all his premises on is just awful and assumes for no reason at all that physical reality is something that exists entirely independently of one’s point of view within it, never justifies this bizarre claim and builds all of his arguments on top of it which then Chalmers cites as if they’re proven.
crt0o@lemm.ee 3 weeks ago
My line of thought is this: the most epistemically primary thing is subjective experience, because it can be known directly, thus it is undeniably real. Due to the principle of ontological parsimony, if everything can be explained in terms of experience, there is no reason to postulate something beyond it (the physical). So the way I would formulate the hard problem would be something more like “Why does our experience contain the appearance of a physical world at all, and how are they related?”.
I guess this might not resonate with you either, if you don’t believe in phenomenal consciousness as all. Personally I have a hard time understanding physicalist reductionism, how can you say that something like the experience of redness is the same thing as some pattern of neurons firing in the brain? These are clearly very different things, and even if one is entirely dependent on the other, it doesn’t mean it’s non-existent or illusory.
pcalau12i@lemmy.world 3 weeks ago
There’s no such thing as “subjective experience,” again the argument for this is derived from a claim that reality is entirely independent of one’s point of view within it, which is just a wild claim and absolutely wrong. Our experience doesn’t “contain” the physical world, experience is just a synonym for observation, and the physical sciences are driven entirely by observation, i.e. what we observe is the physical world. I also never claimed “the experience of redness is the same thing as some pattern of neurons firing in the brain,” no idea where you are getting that from. Don’t know why you are singling out “redness” either. What about the experience of a cat vs an actual cat?
crt0o@lemm.ee 3 weeks ago
What I mean by subjective experience is what you might refer to as what reality looks like from a specific viewpoint or what it appears like when observed. I’m not sure whether you’re assuming a physicalist or idealist position when you say “what we observe is the physical world”. My issue with this is that observation implies the existence of something which is being observed, the appearance upon observation, and possibly also an observer.
If you claim that the physical world doesn’t exist independently of observation, and is thus nothing beyond the totality of observed appearances (seems to me like a form of idealism), then what is being observed? If there is no object being observed, and the fact it it apparent from multiple perspectives is simply a consequence of the coherence of observation, where do the qualities of those appearances originate from? How come things don’t cease to exist when they’re not being observed?
If you claim that the appearances don’t exist independently of the physical world being observed (the physicalist interpretation), why does the world appear different from different perspectives? How do you explain things like hallucinations (there is no physical object being observed, but still some appearance is present)?
The reason I brought up that example is because physicalists usually deny the existence of qualia and claim they’re nothing beyond the brain processes correlated with them.