Further to that third point as well, there’s probably also a question simply of opportunity. You could take the Munich situation as evidence of capability, but it may also have been opportunity plus capability. Intelligence seems like it’s a pretty difficult game and perhaps the successes in the operation bayonet had to do with unlikely and fortunate intelligence scoops that they have not happened upon now and can’t rely upon. Also, while I don’t know much about the post Munich assassinations, it sounds like went on for over twenty years, didn’t really take out many of the actual important directly involved individuals and a lot of the people they would have logically wanted to target successfully went in to hiding out of their reach so if the strategic goal is to behead the organisation that carried out attacks as a defensive strategy to weaken their capacity to do it again, 20 years just to take out relatively minor unimportant figures isn’t really going to work.

That said, it also looks as so many have stated like “taking out Hamas” is more a convenient political smokescreen for a much more sinister goal so a very successful intelligence operation that rapidly took out all their leadership at once would actual run counter to their true objectives in this scenario.