Think about who else has access, who else flags as not part of the mission, where is evidence of this download stored (it’s probably in more places than you’d expect from a digital forensics perspective). Keep in mind tools that delete also leave voids where there should be data, which is highly suspicious. Even something like removing a drive, deleting stuff on another computer, and placing it back could be a bread crumb if the original computer logs write or read cycle counts. Copiers keep records of their documents and users who print them, this can be traced back to the documents themselves.

Also who else in your life is vulnerable to the culprits, how will media spin this against you, how will the culprits lie about your actions and documents? Is what you’re exposing against a shared enemy publicly or a relatively positive entity? Think Bill Clinton and the fawning that made Monica to take the brunt of the scrutiny off of him? Would other governments or companies highly benefit from this information being released to the point that you’d be labeled a spy?

How legal was your access? Coincidental, open door, closed door opened, locked door opened, safe opened (metaphorically for digital). Can your information alone be used to prove its own validity? How much trail have you left in your interactions with other people, especially in text form, to raise you as a suspicious entity? I’d argue if it’s you then already too much is on the internet and you’d be better served passing the concern to someone else in the know if you don’t plan on moving to Russia like Snowden. Speaking of Snowden, make sure that your redactions cover both the copier hardware signature as well as fully remove the things you’re trying to redact. There are journalists who accept tips as well as nonprofits that may take a look without ratting you out. The journalists that Snowden chose were Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras, Barton Gellman, and Ewen MacAskill.